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The UNCTAD Resolution
Among the components of the programme of
action for the implementation of NIEO, none is
more innovative than that calling for increased
collective self-reliance (CSR) or economic co-
operation among developing countries (ECDC).'
The resolution on ECDC (UNCTAD 1979) which
was unanimously agreed at UNCTAD V was one
of the more positive achievements of the confer-
ence. It resolved to convene a special session of
the UNCTAD Committee on ECDC early in 1980
in order to examine the studies carried out by the
UNCTAD Secretariat on ECDC and to consider
the ldcs' proposals in certain priority areas, and to
take appropriate action. In pursuit of these aims,
and with an unprecedented departure from the
UN 'universality' principle, the Secretary General
of UNCTAD was requested to provide the
necessary technical support, conference and
secretariat services for three preparatory meetings
of ldc or other government experts. The specified
priority areas were: the establishment of a global
system of trade preferences among ldcs; coopera-
tion among state trading organisations (STOs) of
ldcs; and the establishment of multinational
marketing enterprises among ldcs.
The UNCTAD Secretariat was also requested 'to
intensify and complete' its ongoing activities and
to submit to the Committee on ECDC action-
oriented proposals based on the Arusha
Programme for Collective Self-Reliance drawn
up by the Group of 77 at their pre-UNCTAD V
Ministerial Meeting held in Arusha in February
1979 (UNCTAD (1) 1979). These proposals were
to cover:
the elaboration, operation and maintenance
of a trade information system regarding the
foreign trade of Ides, taking into account the
continuing work in the UNCTAD/GATT
International Trade Centre and other
international organisations;
CSR and ECDC are used fairly interchangeably in this
article since the focus is on the strategyor actionoriented
aspect of the CSR concept. However, since self-reliance may
be considered as a legitimate end in itself, and since it
inherently contains a collective element (this is what
distinguishes it from the self-help Concept which is inherently
individualistic) then in the broadest interpretation of CSR.
ECOC would be contained within it, hut would not Coincide
with it. In short ECOC may be viewed as means, whereas
CSR may be viewed as both means and end.
the preparation and up-dating of a handbook
of STOs of ldcs and a continuation of such
technical assistance activities as seminars and
consultancy services for individual state
trading organisations;
the provision of technical assistance to
projects for ldc multinational marketing
arrangements;
the provision of assistance for relevant
aspects of monetary and financial cooperation
among ldcs;
the analysis and identification of opportuni-
ties for establishing and promoting joint
marketing ventures among ldcs;
the intensification of its activities, in collabo-
ration with UNIDO, to promote multi-
national production enterprises among ldcs.
Self-reliance as a Conceptual and Strategic
Approach
CSR reflects the desire on the part of the ldcs to
decrease their dependence on the developed
economies; that is, to rely more on themselves,
on their own resources, and on their own vision
of 'development' in order to promote the welfare
of their people. It also reflects disillusion with the
benefits to be derived from a continuation of the
quantity, and more especially the quality, of
their existing links with the industrialised
countries. Finally, it reflects the hope that, by
strengthening cooperative links with each other,
they may improve their position within the inter-
national economic order and thereby promote
their development. As a strategy, CSR may be
described as all or part of that package of policies
involving cooperation between the Ides in fields
such as production, trade, investment and
finance, which they believe will enhance their
self-reliance and promote their development.
CSR embodies two distinct notions of unity; first,
the idea of uniting against an outside group to
force concessions through increased solidarity
and bargaining power, and second, that of
uniting with others in a similar predicament, to
solve common problems collectively. Therefore,
as a strategy, CSR has two components: first,
policies designed to increase the power of the
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Third World; and second, the more 'develop-
mental' package, consisting of policies in the
fields of production, technology, finance and
trade, whose objective is the long-term develop-
ment of the cooperating ldcs. While the latter
aspect of CSR is more important (both for ldcs
and for the world as a whole), the former is
more urgent.
A critical element in Third World power is
control over resources. Ldcs need to transform
the control they have at present over their
resources into some measure of influence over
the industrialised countries, over TNCs, and over
events in the global economy. However, an
existing constraint on the development of Third
World power is the lack of cohesion of the Third
World itself; at this juncture it is more a wish
than a reality. Marc Williams (above) examines
the strengths and weaknesses of the Group of 77,
while Vincent Cable examines the various
attempts at regional groupings among ldcs. This
article concentrates on CSR as a long-term
development tool and considers, first, some of the
proposals that have been made to foster ECDC,
and then the existing production and marketing
arrangements for six commodities to illustrate
both the need for ECDC and the strength of the
vested interests that are likely to oppose it.
Proposals on ECDC and CSR
A comprehensive set of measures and objectives
designed to promote cooperation between ldcs had
already been suggested in the Programme on
ECDC adopted at the Conference of the Group
of 77 held in Mexico City in September 1976, and
in the Arusha Programme for Collective Self-
Reliance drawn up by the Group of 77 at their
pre-UNCTAD V Ministerial Meeting, held in
Arusha in February 1979. Perhaps most usefully,
the UNCTAD Secretariat studies referred to in
the UNCTAD V ECDC resolution and described
at some length below, have identified eight key
elements which could be included in a compre-
hensive CSR strategy. These are: a global system
of trade preferences among developing countries
(GSTP); cooperation among STOs; multinational
marketing and production enterprises; monetary
and financial cooperation; strengthening sub-
regional, regional and inter-regional schemes
of ldc economic cooperation; special favourable
treatment for the least developed island and land-
locked ldcs; cooperation in the transfer and
development of technology; and cooperation in
the insurance sector.
The proposals for a GSTP aim to promote
national production and mutual trade by
48
exploiting emerging complementarities among
ldcs. The importance of STOs lies in their
capacity to implement ECDC and CSR through
joint procurement of imports, market research,
promotion of non-traditional exports and
operating joint facilitation centres in terminal
markets. All these trade measures need to be
accompanied by monetary and financial arrange-
ments to cover multilateral payments and clearing
arrangements, trade financing facilities, and
capital and financial flows. A coordination com-
mittee on multilateral payments arrangements
and monetary cooperation among ldcs which held
its first meeting in July 1978 in Bangkok, is
designed to promote such cooperation.
Constraints on the Implementation of ECDC
Strategies
What are the prospects for implementing these
elements of ECDC in the medium term? If
ECDC and CSR represent an attempt on the part
of the ldcs to alter their dependency status within
an interdependent global economy, then their
present levels of dependency will operate, not
only as a spur to the initiation of ECDC, but also
as a constraint on the implementation of such
strategies. An important part of the failure of
past regional integration schemes can be ascribed
to the asymmetrical nature of the global
economy. This is true even of failings that at first
sight appear to be internal to the ldcs as a group,
such as weakness of political will, inadequate
distribution between members of costs and
benefits, the insignificance of intra-regional
trade, disintegration of convertibility areas,
the absence of adequate dispute settlement
machinery, and reliance on conventional theory
and institutional arrangements for structuring
regional integration schemes. Any search for
manifestations of dependency and constraints on
the implementation of CSR strategies should start
by examining the evidence relating to eight key
questions: what goods are produced, how, and by
whom, who finances production, for whom are
the goods produced, what goods are traded, how
are world prices determined and how are the
goods traded?
The series of UNCTAD studies on primary
commodities, manufactures and invisibles has
addressed these questions. They support the view
that the ldcs are the dependent partners. TNC
producing and marketing activities place proW
duction, pricing, marketing and distribution,
transportation, and the operation of futures
markets, largely beyond the control of the ldcs
in many important branches of economic activity.
CSR strategies, if successfully implemented, could
rhelp to reduce these external controls, but by the
same token, the existence of the controls
constitutes a constraint on the implementation of
CSR strategies. We turn now to the case material
of the UNCTAD studies.
The banana industry 2
International trade in bananas is integrated in the
sense that a few large companies are dominant in
several stages of production and distribution.
Seventy per cent of world trade is controlled by
three TNCs; United Brands (35 per cent),
Standard Fruit (25 per cent) and Del Monte (10
per cent). With the exception of Ecuador, the
large-scale foreign-owned plantation unit has been
a dominant feature in Latin America and the
Caribbean (UNCTAD 1978: 21). In the case of
both the United Fruit Company (UFC) in Central
America and its main competitor Castle and
Cooke (a large food conglomerate which owns
84 per cent of the shares of Standard Fruit),
bananas are only one of a number of products
Banana washing station in Escuintla, Guatemala.
2 This section is based on UNCTAD (1978).
produced on their enormous land holdings in a
large number of countries in the region. Growth
and rapid diversification have been character-
istic of the three large TNCs and as a share of
their total sales, bananas have decreased in
importance.
Because of the vertically-integrated nature of the
TNCs, their influence dominates not only pro-
duction but also pricing, and marketing and
distribution. Competition among them for larger
shares of the world market has apparently contri-
buted to a decline in real prices. Companies have
also pursued policies designed to obtain a low
fob price to assure a larger mark-up on sales to
ripeners and wholesalers (UNCTAD 1978: 30).
The terms of trade for bananas in relation to
manufactures declined by approximately 60 per
cent between 1954 and the end of 1973. These
price declines benefited consumers in the
developed countries and deprived producers of
the benefits of cost-reducing innovations. In
contrast, some countries have been forced to give
production subsidies to counteract rapid increases
in the cost of fuel, transport and distribution.
As a result, according to the UNCTAD study,
there has been a net transfer of real resources
from the continuing producing countries to the
developed consuming countries. The declining
terms of trade, which caused this income drain,
were the result of the tendency of export
availabilities to increase relative to import
demand, and of the domination and control of the
marketing and distribution system by TNCs.
Virtuálly all banana exports from Central
America and the Philippines, and about 50 per
cent of Ecuador's exports, are controlled by
TNCs. Even greater domination is exercised at
the import end where they control over 60 per
cent of total imports into the developed countries.
UNCTAD's estimates indicate that the share of
the local growers in the final retail price is of
the order of 11 per cent. TNC gross revenues,
excluding ripening, are about 35 per cent. In
addition to the income drain, there may also
be development-distorting effects. Historically,
banana production for the world market has been,
and still continues to be, almost exclusively a
plantation industry. Very large tracts of the most
fertile land in the producing countries are owned
by the plantations. The question arises: given the
low returns which accrue to the producing
countries in total and the very small number of
local people who benefit under the prevailing
pattern of trade (UNCTAD 1978: 79), is this a





















Tobacco field in Zanzibar.
The tobacco industry
Control by US- and UK-based TNCs permeates
the entire tobacco industry. The source of the
power of the seven large tobacco TNCs (TTCs)
lies in their control of world cigarette manu-
facturing. These TTCs are vertically integrated
through all the stages of production, marketing,
and distribution, and horizontally integrated, not
only with other commodity sectors of the world
market but also with a variety of other activities
including manufacturing, mining, banking, insur-
ance, shipping, communications, and services.
3 This section is based on UNCTAD (l978a).
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Leaf tobacco is grown and marketed in many
countries. The bulk of output is from small-scale,
labour-intensive peasant farming and share
cropping. About 15 mn peasants and small
farmers grow leaf tobacco. While production is
dominated by four countriesChina, the USA,
India and the USSRmore than half of the leaf
tobacco which enters international trade
emanates from the ldcs. However, in contrast to
bananas, most tobacco produced outside the
centrally-planned economies becomes, in the
words of the UNCTAD study, 'caught in the
transnational web' even if it never enters inter-
national trade because, in most ldcs, 'domestic'
tobacco plants are controlled by the TTCs
(UNCTAD l978a: 106). Six major industrialised
trading areas and countries account for about 85
per cent of tobacco leaf imports. This trade ¡s
almost completely controlled by six transnational
leaf buyers inter-linked with the TTCs who also,
with few exceptions, control the maritime trans-
port used in the movement of raw tobacco.
Tobacco manufacturing in the non-socialist
developed and developing countries is dominated
by seven large TTCs with total sales in 1976
exceeding $32 bn. In the marketing and distri-
bution of cigarettes, the TTCs also exercise
decisive control. Their penetration of both
developed and less developed markets is realised,
in the words of the UNCTAD study, 'through
the advertising complex of large transnational
advertising agencies, harnessed to a highly
sophisticated network of mass-persuasion tech-
nology' (UNCTAD 1978a: 82).
In addition to transfer pricing and repatriated
profits, there is a further income drain and
development distortion from the operation of
TNCs in the ldcs. These corporations have
borrowed domestic capital to meet their business
requirements. TNCs compete with local industry
for domestic savings. Through the medium of
the transnational banking system, they gain
access to local finance which, in many instances,
enables them to take over local firms whose
access to funds is more limited. As the UNCTAD
study points out, linkages between the big
banking corporations and the tobacco conglome-
rates are common. It adds that between 1960 and
1970, approximately 78 per cent of manufacturing
operations of US corporations in Latin America
were financed by domestic capital. For the TTCs,
an estimated 90 per cent of their aggregate
investments in Latin America was financed
by domestic capital (UNCTAD 1978: ch. 1,
section E).
The cotton futures market
Developing countries regard price instability as
a serious disadvantage of primary commodity
production. Consumers of primary products in
the developed economies (who are often producers
of manufactured goods) are, likewise, concerned
about the effects of commodity price instability.
Activity on futures markets reflects these
concerns.
The participants on the commodity futures
markets are hedgers and speculators. The former
buy and sell futures contracts to counteract the
impact of future price fluctuations on the value
of physical purchases and sales of commodities.
Speculators enter the market in order to exploit
price swings and make a profit. An UNCTAD
study (UNCTAD 1978b) of the cotton futures
market highlights the dependent position of the
developing commodity-producing economies in
world commodity markets. The most important
hedgers on the cotton futures market are the
giant cotton-trading conglomerates. Approxi-
mately 15 large multi-product corporations handle
90 per cent of globally traded cotton. These
corporations have linkages with the raw cotton
and textile industries, and with finance capital,
and play a dominant role in trading in other
commodities.
The giant multi-commodity traders engage in
both hedging and speculation, helped by the
efficient commodity intelligence network they
possess (which is unavailable to most producers).
They also engage in manipulative practices such
as 'long squeezes' whereby they 'corner' or
control a large proportion of the futures contracts
and of the deliverable cotton supplies and then
use these two types of control to alter futures
prices. In the words of the UNCTAD study,
'The cotton futures market has become a trading
mechanism whereby large traders, individually or
through collusive manipulative practices, can
acquire substantial gains and, in so doing,
destabilise prices' (UNCTAD l978b: 13). Thus,
far from contributing to the free interplay of
supply and demand and to stabilising prices, the
futures markets, when controlled by the great
multi-commodity traders, are a source of
domination and instability.
The electrical industry
The importance of the electrical industry in the
industrialisation of the ldcs and in their potential
to implement CSR strategies rests on the size of
the industry, the nature of the product (capital
and consumer goods), its technology and the way
in which technology is acquired, the difficulties
associated with establishing and maintaining
indigenous firms, and the general pervasiveness
of restrictive business practices in international
markets. The industry consists of a wide range
of firms producing capital goods (equipment for
generation, transmission and distribution of
electricity) and consumer goods (household
appliances and electronic products). In a study
undertaken for UNCTAD, Newfarmer (1978)
states that the industry can be described as
concentrated in the sense that the leading 20
TNCs produce most of the industry's sales and
control most of its advanced technology. These
leading firms are interrelated: within markets,
in equity cross-holdings, in joint ventures, in
licensing arrangements to share technology, in
consortia and in cartels.







From the beginning of the present century,
restrictive practices have operated to restrain
competition, divide up the world market, and
control the flow of technology. Cross-licensing
contracts and cartels raised barriers to entry in
countries outside the pioneering ones, especially
Idcs. As a result, growth in the electrical
industry tended to lag behind the general progress
of industrialisation in ldcs up to the Second
World War. The concentrated structure of inter-
national production and the associated restrictive
practices limited competition and led to monopoly
profits which 'served to shift investible surplus
from the developing periphery to the industrial-
ised centre' (Newfarmer 1978: 166).
The growth of protection in the ldcs during the
early stages of import substitution industrialisa-
tion (ISI) raised barriers to imports and induced
TNCs to invest in ldcs to hold their markets. This
did not necessarily reduce imports, particularly
during the early stages of ISI. It substituted
imports of intermediate products and heavy
machinery from the parent TNC for finished
products.
Newfarmer cites three ways in which the inter-
national market power of the TNCs affects the
structures of investment and development. The
first is the creation of spheres of influence in
the location of investment which restricts entry,
produces monopoly profits, and recreates the
concentrated market structures of the investing
country. The second is the takeover of local firms
and denationalisation of the industry in the ldc;
from the point of view of the TNCs this reduces
competition, but from the point of view of the
host country, distorts the pattern of development
by reducing indigenous investment and confining
the local íncome flow to wages, instead of wages
and profits. According to Newfarmer, this take-
over process becomes more frequent as develop-
ment advances. In Latin America for example, 42
per cent of US electrical TNCs established
subsidiary operations by acquiring an existing
domestic firm in the 1958-68 period. In Mexico,
60 per cent of such TNCs established their opera-
tions through takeover, and in Brazil takeovers
accounted for almost the whole of the substantial
increase in the foreign share of the electrical
industry between 1960 and 1974. In Brazil local
firms which were not taken over went bankrupt
because they fell behind in the technology race,
or were driven out of business by predatory
pricing. The survival of indigenous firms was not
helped by the fact that USAID loans and Euro-
pean development loans for heavy electrical
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investments were tied to imports of electrical
plant manufactured in the lending country
(Epstein and Mirow 1977).
The third distortion is the impact on profits of
concentration and product differentiation. These
tend to move positively with each other and to
reduce the efficiency of the economy through
eroding the allocative function of the price
mechanism. Import and export trade in electrical
goods is controlled by the TNC. Intra-firm trade
between the investing country parent and the
periphery subsidiary supplies intermediate and
capital goods which the latter is not geared (or
allowed) to produce. These sales, conducted at
transfer prices, result in the shifting of income
flows between the countries in which the TNC
operates at rates and in quantities which reflect
the global policy of the parent company with
respect to the most advantageous location of
declared profit, given the tax, exchange control
and investment opportunity structures of the
various countries.
In addition, interdependence and cartelisation
among the TNCs (frowned upon within the
developed countries but permitted by them when
it relates to exports) leads to inflated prices for
some imports, aggravating general inflationary
pressures and balance of payments problems.
Spheres of influence agreements with respect to
markets and investment locations, and barriers
to entry into developed country markets
effectively prevent the ldcs from exporting
electrical goods unless it suits TNC interests. As
Newfarmer points out, the expansion of trade
can benefit both the TNCs and the ldcs. How-
ever, the use of restrictive practices distorts the
distribution of the gains from trade between the
two parties in favour of the former.
Shipping
Maritime transport is an important element in
the effort to increase the links between ldcs, and
therefore in any progress they may make towards
CSR. The ldcs account for over 60 per cent in
volume of world ocean cargo. Yet in 1948 they
owned merely 4 per cent of the world fleet; by
1970 this figure had only increased to 7.6 per
cent.
The ability of ldc lines to influence Liner
Conference operation will increase soon with the
coming into force of the UN Code of Conduct
for Liner Conferences. An important principle
of the Code is that it would give 'rights' to each
partner in a trading agreement to carry a certain
percentage of the goods (40 per cent to the
exporter's lines, 40 per cent to the importer's
and a 'significant share' of the remainder to third
flags). It would also institutionalise the process of
consultation between Conferences and shippers
(the exporters and importers) on the determina-
tion of freight rates. One disadvantage which
most of the ldcs suffer at this stage in their
development arises from the fact that manu-
factured goods are relatively new exports for
them. New items are charged 'not otherwise
specified' (nos) rates which tend to be significantly
higher than average. In addition, the headquarters
of the Conferences are located in the industrial-
ised countries and there is a lack of high-level
representation in the less developed areas, which
impedes serious consultation, let alone negotia-
tion. Problems of ldc participation are even more
acute in respect to bulk carriers. At UNCTAD V,
the industrialised countries voted against a Group
of 77 proposal, adopted by the Conference, on
bulk tradeswhich account for four-fifths of
maritime trade, including most primary
commodity carriage.
Insurance
An invisible item linked to the cost of ldc
exports, is insurance. Many ldcs in recent years
have strengthened the national character of their
insurance markets. However, it is difficult to
acquire control over the sector, because of such
factors as shortages of finance and high-level
skills, and the control exercised internationally
by major companies based in the industrialised
countries.
In some ldcs, state monopolies covering all
insurance operations have been established; in
others, insurance companies have been formed
involving participation by the state with domestic
and/or foreign private interests. It is becoming
apparent, however, that the participation of
foreign private companies, whether independently
or jointly with local firms often creates a situation
where control can be seized by the foreign
partner, even if its equity holding is a minority
one. An UNCTAD study notes that Bhutan,
Burundi, Lesotho, and Rwanda have each
recently established their own insurance com-
panies with participation by the state and foreign
private companies (UNCTAD 1977). The study
draws particular attention to the situation in
Burundi. The foreign group subscribed only 10
per cent of the registered capital of the company
(CABU), but in exchange for technical services in
the formation and operation of the new company
(which will have a de facto domestic monopoly),
the foreign minority partners have obtained a
commission of 1.5 per cent on gross premiums,
sole rights to place reinsurance, and 35 per cent of
the company's reinsurance commission. As the
UNCTAD study sums it up: 'Whatever the operat-
ing results of CABU may be, the foreign partners
are sure of making a profit at the expense of
national interest' (UNCTAD 1977: 1).
On the question of reinsurance, the volume of
these services which the ldcs have purchased
abroad to balance and protect their national
portfolios has been increasing steadily since the
establishment of national insurance industries
(UNCTAD 1977: 10). Ldcs have reacted in a
number of ways. Some of them have taken steps
to encourage local insurers to retain a larger
portion of the risks insured and to transfer abroad
only the part really in excess of their reten-
tion capacity. However, some disaster-stricken
countries have recently required their local
insurers to increase the amount of reinsurance
cover obtained abroad, highlighting the weakness
of the insurance industry in these areas. The
UNCTAD study points out that there is a number
of internal agreements between international
reinsurers, and these reinsurers can occasionally
apply a cartel policy. The problems associated
with the placing of reinsurance business abroad
and those associated with foreign participation in
local insurance companies are intertwined. The
UNCTAD study notes 'there are cases in which
the main object of such foreign participation is
to obtain reinsurance business from the subsidiary
company and to ensure that decisions concerning
such reinsurance are not taken independently'
(UNCTAD 1977: 26).
Institutional Implications
UNCTAD argues that the creation of a CSR
system calls for concerted action in a number of
interrelated areas. While detailed consideration
needs to be given to the different activities and
elements, 'the interrelationships between them
must be viewed as part of a comprehensive
strategy' (UNCTAD 1979a: 4). UNCTAD seems
particularly concerned about the distribution of
costs and benefits which may arise from the
separate elements of the ECDC programme
'By pursuing simultaneously a large number of
cooperation activities within a comprehensive
framework', UNCTAD argues, 'it will help to
ensure the widest possible distribution of benefits,
since possible unevenness in distribution from
particular activities can be counterbalanced by
the pattern of distribution from others, with the
result that a rough balance of equity can be
attained without too much difficulty' (UNCTAD
1979a: 5).
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There are several approaches to institution
building, all of which have both advantages and
problems. Some argue that single-function
groupings, such as a commodity cartel, are likely
to fade away when the situation that gives rise
to their formation has passed (Guetzkow
1971: 398-415). Then there is the problem that
regional multifunctional groupings may inhibit
the formation of global groupings. On balance, it
would be advantageous to link the various
operational approaches. Even though a number
of ldcs might not be participants in all the various
types of schemes, it is likely that all countries
would belong to one or more cooperative scheme,
such as producer associations, preference systems,
multinational production and marketing enter-
prises, export credit schemes, regional banking
groups, and schemes of subregional or regional
economic integration. To preserve existing
cooperative bonds and to encourage the develop-
ment of new ones, the various schemes could be
linked, even if only as negotiating groups for
trading benefits within and between the various
schemes.
Prospects for such collaborative schemes would
be enhanced by the establishment of an organ-
isation for Southern economic cooperation and
development (OSCD), with its own permanent
secretariat and research capability. Such an
organisation could help to build unity Out of
diversity and with research support, stimulated
by the objectives of promoting the development
of the Third World, common negotiating
positions on economic issues relating to NIEO
could be elaborated at the various international
fora. Regional groupings (for example, regional
integration schemes) could act as intermediate
linkage mechanisms. In this capacity, one of
their main functions could be the negotiation of
regionally-coordinated investment conditions for
foreign firms and improved mechanisms for the
transfer of appropriate technology. The existence
of an OSCD should speed up the negotiation of
generalised improvements in the international
economic order (including various Codes of
Conduct), but regional modifications to deal with
specific regional and national problems can be
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best negotiated, and their implementation
supervised, by regional bodies.
Finally, it would be very important to link the
single-purpose groupings to national and local
organisations to ensure the connection between
CSR and national and local self-reliance. It
should be easier for groups of ldcs with self-
reliant approaches internally to agree on supra-
national equity in the distribution of the bene-
fits of regional growth and Third-World-wide
improvements to prevent polarisation among CSR
participants.
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